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Mr. Kyle Crichton 
Editorial Page 
The New York Times 
229 West 43d St. 
New York, N.Y. 10036 
-
101 N. Carolina Ave. S.E. 
Washington, o.c. 20003 
H: (202) 543-5227 
W: (202) 633-4409 
May 1, 1990 
Dear Mr. Crichton: 
Enclosed please find for your consideration a reply to the 
column on habeas corpus reform by Judge Irving Kaufman that 
appeared in this morning's New York Times. Habeas corpus reform 
is certainly an important and topical issue that deserves 
treatment in the Times. However, as the enclosed reply makes 
clear, Judge Kaufman's piece presents only one side of a complex 
issue and demands an informed response. As both pieces make 
clear, a number of legislative proposals for habeas corpus reform 
are pending before the Congress and will be acted upon before the 
close of this session. 
I recently completed a clerkship on the United States 
supreme Court, and I am currently employed by the Department of 
Justice in Washington, D.C. You may reach me by telephone during 
the day at (202) 633-4409, in the evening at (202) 543-5227. 
Thank you for your time and attention. 
Since::,ely, ~- ::, / ,:· 
-/~ / ,, / ; ~ . .. / 
~-✓#'/ --~ ,/ ,· ·,>,l .... 




NO JUSTICE--AT ANY COST 
by Andrew G. McBride1 
I turned with great interest and anticipation to Judge 
Kaufman's recent commentary on habeas corpus reform contained in 
these pages. Judge Kaufman is a well-respected jurist of 
deserved scholarly reputation, and I have often found myself 
engrossed in and enlightened by his careful analysis of topical 
legal issues in this publication. Only in the context of such 
great expectations could Judge Kaufman's cursory treatment of the 
issue of habeas corpus reform so disappoint and dismay. Judge 
Kaufman misses the mark in both description and prescription in 
the area of federal habeas corpus litigation. Here's why. 
Judge Kaufman begins by painting a picture of what he terms 
"speedy justice" in the context of death penalty litigation. The 
Supreme Court has "cut back on the scope of the writ" threatening 
to render it "a dinosaur on the legal landscape." This in turn 
conjures up images of an unseemly rush to the gallows--death row 
inmates with meritorious legal claims are barred at the federal 
court house door. A glance at the true state of death penalty 
litigation in this country reveals that Judge Kaufman's vision is 
nothing less than surreal. Far from a dinosaur teetering on the 
brink of extinction, the federal writ of habeas corpus is more 
aptly compared to Carl Sagan's universe: it is constantly 
expanding. 
Judge Kaufman makes reference to the venerable origins and 
constitutional status of the "Great Writ" of habeas corpus. He 
then suggests that this august legal tool is in jeopardy. The 
reference is misleading. 
The original writ of habeas corpus was a civil suit filed 
either to challenge detention without trial or to challenge 
detention pursuant to the judgment of a court with no 
jurisdiction to try the defendant. The writ was unavailable 
where the defendant was accorded a full and fair trial. This was 
the conception of the Great Writ when Congress first extended 
federal habeas corpus to state prisoners in 1867. Since that 
time, the writ has, by judicial interpretation, grown to bear 
little resemblance to its venerable English forbear. After 
trial, after appeal, and after filing a state court petition for 
habeas corpus, prisoners use the relatively new, substantially 
1 Mr. McBride completed a clerkship on the Supreme Court in 
June, 1989 and is presently employed at the Department of Justice 
in Washington, D.C. The views expressed herein represent his 
personal opinions. 
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expanded Great Writ to contest their convictions and sentences 
again and again and again. The only limit on the number of 
federal habeas corpus petitions a capital defendant may file 
today is the creativity of defense counsel. 
A few facts about death penalty litigation and the use of 
habeas corpus today confirm that, contrary to Judge Kaufman's 
dire pronouncements, the new Great Writ is alive and well--
indeed it has effectively nullified the death penalty as a 
sanction for first degree murder in this country. The Justice 
Department reports that, in 1988, 296 individuals were convicted 
of first degree murder and sentenced to death. In that same 
year, only 11 capital sentences were actually carried out. The 
average delay from time of conviction and sentence to time of 
execution of sentence in 1988 was six years and eight months. In 
fact, in 1988 more death row inmates died of natural causes than 
had their sentences executed. The reason is the endless lottery 
of habeas corpus--file a "new" (or slightly refurbished) claim 
before a new judge and perhaps another stay of execution will be 
forthcoming. 
Judge Kaufman's three prescriptions for reform would only 
exacerbate the abuse of our habeas corpus system that now plagues 
capital litigation. First, Judge Kaufman would make all new 
legal rules fully retroactive "at least with respect to capital 
crimes." This would effectively reconstitute the Great Writ as 
an endless time machine. For example, a defendant properly tried 
and convicted of murder in 1980 could succeed in delaying the 
execution of his sentence for a decade, and then simply enter his 
habeas corpus time machine to argue that his conviction is 
contrary to a new Supreme Court decision issued in May 1990. 
Judge Kaufman argues that this retroactivity is necessary "to 
provide state courts with an incentive to apply the Constitution 
fully and fairly." It is difficult to see how this is so since 
the state court judge in 1980 cannot with any certainty predict 
the results of cases that might be decided ten years later. 
Perhaps Judge Kaufman simply means that state court judges must 
be given an incentive to guess for the most "pro-defendant" 
future. 
Judge Kaufman's second suggestion is equally infirm. He 
would have Congress codify a "deliberate bypass" test where a 
prisoner omits a legal argument from an initial federal habeas 
corpus petition but includes it in a second petition. Under this 
"subjective standard," the state would have to prove that the 
prisoner "omit(ted) the new claim from the original petition for 
the purpose of delay." No litigant has a greater incentive to 
"sandbag" by withholding arguments for use in later habeas corpus 
petitions than an inmate on death row. A capital litigant 
seeking delay has little to gain by putting forward all the best 
legal challenges to his or her conviction in a timely manner. 
Judge Kaufman's "subjective standard" indulges this incentive and 
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would effectively assure the filing of claims in a piecemeal 
fashion in an endless series of habeas corpus petitions. 
Finally, Judge Kaufman would substantially revise the 
doctrine of "procedural default." This refers to a situation 
where a state prisoner has failed to properly raise an argument 
in his state court trial or appeal, but wishes a federal court to 
nonetheless address the argument in the context of a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding. Because allowing such claims would 
encourage litigants to violate state rules of procedure, the 
Supreme Court has developed what is known as the "cause and 
prejudice test." If a state prisoner can show "cause" for not 
raising the issue (~, the legal argument was unavailable or 
his counsel was incompetent) and prejudice (~, that the 
alleged error affected the outcome at trial) the federal court 
will entertain the claim despite the "procedural default" in 
state court. In addition, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
it would waive the "cause and prejudice" requirement if faced 
with a possible "miscarriage of justice," such as the conviction 
of a possibly innocent person. Thus, contrary to Judge Kaufman's 
suggestions, these rules are neither "rigid," nor are, as he 
asserts, "the most compelling cases ... barred from review 
because of a technical slip by the defense counsel." Under Judge 
Kaufman's view, habeas corpus petitioners would only be bound by 
their attorneys' failure to raise claims in the state courts 
where the attorney swore under oath that the decision was a 
tactical one, and not an error. The incentives for attorney 
misbehavior in capital litigation that would be engendered by 
Judge Kaufman's test are not pleasant to contemplate. 
Thus, there is no rush to the gallows, the Supreme Court has 
not eviscerated the Great Writ, and the only crisis at hand is 
the complete and utter nullification of the penalty for first 
degree murder in 36 States. Rather than heeding Judge Kaufman's 
suggestions, Congress should turn its attention to Justice 
Powell's carefully balanced proposal for habeas corpus reform 
which has the support of the Bush Administration. Under Justice 
Powell's proposed legislation, States that provide quality 
counsel to capital litigants in state court would benefit from a 
statute of limitations and strict rules concerning successive 
petitions for habeas corpus in federal court. That is the start 
of true reform. 
- 3 -
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/ Speedy Justice 
- At What Cost? 
By Irving R. Kaufman 
F
ederal habeas corpus 
may become a din~ 
saur on the legal land• 
scape unless Congress 
acts quickly to pre-
serve its existence. Re-
cen t Supreme Court decisions have 
cut back the scope of the writ, and a 
bi ll c1rcu lat1ng in Congress would fur-
ther hmn its availability. 
For years. Federal habeas corpus 
has proved an essenual guardian of 
ind1v1dual liberties and an important 
vehic le for establishing landmark 
consmutional Jaw. The writ remains 
the primary means by which sta(e 
prisoners can challenge in Federal 
court the consutuuonality of their 
conv1ct1ons or sentences. 
Because of frequent abuse throu&h 
repeated meritless applications for 
review. however, the writ's unique 
history and function seem on the 
verge of dilut ion. A majority of the 
Supreme Court and Congress appear 
preoccupied with the problems of 
dela y caused by piecemeal and repe-
m 1ous li tigation rather than with the 
need to safeguard essential liberties. 
The Supreme Court has barred in• 
ma tes from seeking relief based on 
" new rules" of law - that Is, le&al in-
terpretations - that were not in ef• 
fect when their last appeal was ex• 
hausted and their convictions became 
fina l. Last fall , Senator Joseph Biden, 
Democrat of Maryland, Introduced a 
bill that would effectively prohibit 
successive habeas corpus petitlona 
and li mit an inmate factna capital 
punishment to a sin&le round of state 
and Federal post-c:onVictJan chal-
lenges. 
Soc iety unquestionably IUffers 
when the availability of the habeas 
I rvi ng R. Kaufman is a ;wi,e of the 
United States Court of Appeals for th• 
Second C1rcu1t. 
corpus writ is abused by inmates who 
1enerate fruitless litigation in our a 
overloaded Federal judicial system. 
Yet, as reported by the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York, ap-
proximately 40 percent of all Inmates 
convicted of capital crimes obtain 
aome relief In post<00viction pr~ 
ceedings. 
Resort to the death penalty, while 
legally defensible in limited ctrcum• 
stances, must be preceded by a thor-





1rounds underlyln& a convtctlon. 
While a speedy and efficient system 
ta desirable, a just system is Indispen-
sable. Pra1mat.1sm should not serve 
as an excuse for cutlinl off Federal 
judicial review. 
Proper lesislaUon could redirect 
the current path of habeas corpus and 
prnerve the historic tunctJon of the 
Great Writ - which dates to 17th cen• 
tury EnaJand and was codified by the 
Flnt eona,us In 1719 - as an ave-
nue for relief. Three imponant areu 
muat be addreued. 
Ftnt., at least with respect to capi• 
tal crtma, Conpeu should favor a 
policy of fully retroactive leaal rules. 
If habeas corpus review truly ta to 
provide state couru with an Incentive 
to apply the Constitution fully and 
fairly, we should not retreat from ap-
plyin& the pr1nctpla of constitutional 
law retroactively. · 
JranJcally, the present i»-retroac-
Uvtty Nie rewards thole defendants 
Ull 
whose cases progress more slowly 
through the legal system. The longer 
It takes to reach a fina l state of con-
viction, the more const1tut1onal rules 
may t,ecome available t.o the inmate 
for use tn a habeas corpus challenge 
to that conviction. The pnu ii given 
to those who willfully delay. 
Second, Conaress could just as 
easily limit vexatious and repetitive 
post-<:0nViction liugation by enacung 
iea1slation strictly endorsing the Su• 
preme Court 's "deliberate bypass" 
standard. Under this subjective t.est. 
I a prisoner may mount successive at• 
tacks on his conv1c t1on - provided he 
md not omit the new claim from the 
ortatnal petition for the purpo&e of 
delay. Congress lhould scorn the 
trend tn some Federal couns to close 
the door to habeas corpus relief by 
convenin& this subjective standard 
Into an objective t.est that pays little 
or no attention to the tndtvtdual cir• 
cumstances of each inmate. 
Third, Congress should cut through 
the hornet 's nest of leaal doctrines 
collectively known as "procedural de-
fault." Under a ri&id application of 
these rules, the most compelling 
cases are sometimes barred from re-
View because of a technical slip by 
the defense counsel. While there are 
times when counsel for the defense 
makes a tactical choice to waive ob-
jections or claims, an inmate should 
not be precluded from relying on ar-
suments omitted from the original 
proceedinl because of counsel' s 
error. 
Throu&h these simple measures 
Con1ress can save the Great Writ and 
preserve for us all the ,ndividual 
UberUes ,uaranteed by the Bill of 
Rilhts, For some, the difference can 


















Justice Powell May 1, 1990 
Hew 
Habeas Corpus Update 
The library and a friend on the Senate Judiciary staff 
both inform me that Jack Brooks of Texas is the Chairman of 
the House Judiciary Committee. Brooks has been ill recent-
ly. It is possible that Rep. Kastenmeier is serving as Act-
ing Chairman. 
There is no real news on the progress of habeas reform 
in the Congress. Habeas reform is schedul~d to come to the 
Senate floor for debate on May 21. It is rumored that 
Southern Democrats are attempting fashion a bill somewhere 
"between" your proposal and the Biden Bill. At this time, 
the only pending bills are those we have reviewed: (1) Sena-
tor Thurmond's broad reform proposal; (2) The Powell Commit-
tee Bill, introduced by Senator Thurmond; and (3) the Biden 
Bill. As for the House side, there seems little chance of a 
bill emerging. There are rumors that some in the House 
would like to see a House Bill that would "head off" the 
Powell Committee bill. Any legisilation coming from the 
House is likely to be similar to the Biden Bill, or worse, 
perhaps adopting the ABA proposal. 
R.H.P. 
-
Lewis F. Powell 
Associate Justice (Retired) 
United States Supreme Court 
One First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
U.S. Depart. of Justice 




Washington, D.C 20530 
5 
~ JD ~ 
May 2, 1990 ~ ~ 
~ ~ ' ~ 
~ -
.3 MAY l99lJ 
Enclosed please find a proposed editorial piece on habeas 
corpus reform which I sent to The New York Times yesterday. The 
piece responds to Judge Irving Kaufman's earlier op-ed (attached) 
advocating certain habeas "reforms." I also got in a good word 
for the work of your distinguished Committee. I don't hold out 
much hope that they will publish it, but it felt great in the 
writing! 
My best to Hew and Sally. 
Enclosure 
cc: R. Hewitt Pate 
Law Clerk to Justice Kennedy 
Andrew G. McBride 
Special Assistant to the 
Assistant Attorney General 
Lewis F. Powell 
Associate Justice (Retired) 
United States Supreme Court 
One First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Legal Counsel 
Washington . D.C :!0530 
May 2, 1990 
Enclosed please find a proposed editorial piece on habeas 
corpus reform which I sent to The New York Times yesterday. The 
piece responds to Judge Irving Kaufman's earlier op-ed (attached) 
advocating certain habeas "reforms." I also got in a good word 
for the work of your distinguished Committee. I don't hold out 
much hope that they will publish it, but it felt great in the 
writing! 
My best to Hew and Sally. 
Enclosure 
cc: R. Hewitt Pate 
Law Clerk to Justice Kennedy 
Andrew G. McBride 
Special Assistant to the 
Assistant Attorney General 
-/ 
~ ~1-,,; 01/ -- -~ t, J l J L-v V 
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May 2, 1990 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your note of April 30. It is good to 
know that you will speak to the ALI about the need for re-
form of federal habeas corpus review of capital sentencing -
"whether the members like it or not!" It will be helpful 
for me to have a copy of what you say. 
I enclose a memo of this date from Hew Pate. There 
is little we can do about the politics of this issue. 





Hew: I doubt that what the Chief says will change signifi-
cantly what I normally would say. I therefore will welcome, 
as always, your help with a draft. The Chief's talk proba-
bly can be obtained from Janet in his chambers by Friday, 
May 11. 
May 3, 1990 
PERSONAL 
Dear Andrew: 
Thank you for your letter of May 
2, enclosing your piece on habeas corpus 
reform that you have sent to The New York 
Times. 
You will not be surprised when I 
say that I think your article is excellent, 
and I hope that The New York Times will 
publish it. 
We still miss you here at the 
Court. I am glad that you and Hew have a 




Andrew G. McBride, Esquire 
Special Assistant to the 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of Legal Counsel 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Washington, D. C. 20530 
lfp/ ss 
cc: R. Hewitt Pate, Esquire ✓ 
(/2~ 
-
May 3, 1990 
PERSONAL 
Dear Andrew: 
Thank you for your letter of May 
2, enclosing your piece on habeas corpus 
reform that you have sent to The New York 
Times. 
You will not be surprised when I 
say that I think your article is excellent, 
and I hope that The New York Times will 
publish it. 
We still miss you here at the 
Court. I am glad that you and Hew have a 
strong friendship that should last over the 
years. 
Sincerely, 
Andrew G. McBride, Esquire 
Special Assistant to the 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of Legal Counsel 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Washington, D. C. 20530 
lfp/ ss 
cc: R. Hewitt Pate, Esquire 
-
,ju.prtnU <!Jomt of tqt ~~ ,jtaftg 
~ag!ringhtn. J. QJ. 2llffe)l.,;l 
C HAM BER S OF" 







May 3, 1990 
is a draft copy of the speech about capital 
which I intend to give at the A.L.I. meeting on 




May 4, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee - Hearing May 24, 1990 
Dear Hew: 
I enclose a copy of the letter of May 4, from Con-
gressman Jack Brooks, Chairman of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary. 
The letter confirms the invitation for me to 
testify, and states the Committee's requirements with re-
spect to prepared statements. These are more than a little 
burdensome. We are requested to file 50 copies of my state-
ment not later than Tuesday, May 22, and suggests that an 
extra "35 statements would be appreciated." 
In addition, we are requested to file 50 copies of 
a one page summary. 
R. Hewitt Pate, Esquire 
lfp/ss 
Enc. 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Sincerely, 
Enclosing a copy of Chairman Bfooks' letter and "notice to 
witnesses." 
MAJORITY MEMBERS 
JACK BROOKS. TEXAS, CHAIRMAN 
ROBERT W . KASTENMEIER, WISCONSIN 
DON EDWARDS, CALIFORNIA 
- ~,.-, i. ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS 
JOHN CONYERS, JR., MICHIGAN 
ROMANO L MAZZOLI, KENTUCKY 
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, NEW JERSEY 
MIKE SYNAR, OKLAHOMA 
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, COLORADO 
DAN GLICKMAN, KANSAS 
BARNEY FRANK, MASSACHUSETTS 
GEO. W. CROCKETT. JR .. MICHIGAN 
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, NEW YORK 
BRUCE A. MORRISON, CONNECTICUT 
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, OHIO 
LAWRENCE J . SMITH, FLORIDA 
HOWARD L BERMAN, CALIFORNIA 
RICK BOUCHER, VIRGINIA 
<rongrt.s.s of tht tlnittd i,tatt.s 
iRouse of Represmtatines 
HARLEY D. STAGGERS, JR., WEST VIRGINIA 
JOHN BRYANT, TEXAS 
MEL LEVINE, CALIFORNIA 
GEORGE E. SANGMEISTER, ILLINOIS 
CRAIG A. WASHINGTON, TEXAS 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
2138 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6216 
May 4, 1990 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, DC 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
~ M~'< ,s~' 
MINORITY MEMBERS 
HAMILTON FISH, JR., NEW YORK 
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, CALIFORNIA 
HENRY J. HYDE, ILLINOIS 
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., WISCONSIN 
BILL McCOLLUM, FLORIDA 
GEORGE W. GEKAS, PENNSYLVANIA 
MICHAEL DEWINE, OHIO 
WILLIAM E. DANNEMEYER, CALIFORNIA 
HOWARD COBLE, NORTH CAROLINA 
0 . FRENCH SLAUGHTER, JR., VIRGINIA 
LAMAR S. SMITH, TEXAS 
CHUCK DOUGLAS. NEW HAMPSHIRE 
CRAIG T. JAMES, FLORIDA 
TOM CAMPBELL, CALIFORNIA 
MAJORITY-225-3951 
MINORITY-225-6906 
The Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice is planning to conduct a legislative 
hearing on the issue of habeas corpus. The hearing will be held 
at 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, May 24, 1990 in room 2226 Rayburn House 
Office Building. 
I would like to invite you to appear and testify. Please 
summarize your opening statement so that it does not exceed five 
minutes. Enclosed you will find a notice which sets forth the 
Committee's requirement that prepared statements be filed at least 
48 hours prior to your scheduled appearance. In accordance with 
Committee policy, 50 copies of your statement must be submitted by 
no later than Tuesday, May 22, 1990. Please forward them to the 
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice, 2137 Rayburn House Office Building, 
Washington, D.C. 20515. Due to the large number of Members (15) on 
the Subcommittee, an extra thirty-five statements would be 
appreciated. 





acceptance of this invitation would be 
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
HOUie o, REPJIIUCNTATIVU 
NOTICE TO WITNESSES 
,,eporctl Sf ofem111f1 · 
Section 1 tS(b) of the Le~•tatlve Reor,anfzatfon Act ot 19'10 providea 
that each commlttet of the House of Repruentatlvea ,halt, Insofar M prac-
tlcab1t, require all witneaaea appe.uln1 betore It to Alt In advance wrlttea 
1tatementa of their proposed testlmont, and to UmJt their oraJ preaentaUon 
to• brltf 1umma17. 
The House Committee on the J'udJclary wm requf re all witnesse, ached• 
uted to teattt1 betore Ii to provtde the Committee with a znlnfmum of 60 
coplu ot a prepared ,tatement and 60 cople, of a one-pare aummaey at 
Jwt torty~irM houra prior to the ,chedultd appearanu of the wttnw. . . . 
While there ft no aet fonn required for the preJ)ared atatement, It 11 reeom• 
. Sfrtlll~ 
mended that the 1tatement be trpewrltten, ~•paced, or printed. The 
60 coplea wm be for the uae of the rnembtra and at&ff of the CommJttet. It 
. . 
the wltnw dulrea the Committee to rnalce available to the prw, or the 
public, copies of the prepared 1tatement, tht witness wlt1 provide the Corn• 
rn[ttee Jn advance of the hea.rin1 with auch additional copfea as may be 
dealrab!e for dlatrlbutfon. A copy of a blorraphlcat ,ketch fa r~ufred to 






TO: The Chief Justice May 4, 1990 
FROM: Hew Pate 
RE: ALI Speech -- Capital Habeas Corpus 
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to review your 
excellent speech on capital habeas corpus. I have the 
following comments: 
Page 1: The House subcommittee hearing has now been 
moved back to May 24th. As for the length of delay, the 
average time for prisoners whose sentenced are actually car-
ried out is over eight years. It may be useful to point out 
that many prisoners have been awaiting execution far longer. 
Since the rate of execution is far lower than the rate of 
entry of new capital prisoners into the system, it is inev-
itable that the delay in carrying out many sentences will be 
far longer than eight years. 
Page 3: For an ALI audience, it might be useful to 
emphasize that the statutory mechanism of §2254 is not the 
writ of habeas corpus mentioned in the Constitution. The 
constant talk about the "Great Writ" in this context by op-
ponents of reform is misleading. You might note that the 
original writ was a challenge to detention without trial, 
and that the modern expansions of even the statutory §2254 
remedy have come about mostly through judicial innovation. 
- 2 -
Page 4: It is vital to point out that the incentives 
for the capital prisoner and the prisoner serving a term of 
years are exactly the opposite with respect to habeas re-
lief. This is a good and important part of the speech. 
Page 5: Rather than saying that "most" states have 
their own system of collateral review, it would be fair to 
say that "virtually all" do. I researched this point about 
a year ago for Justice Powell. All states appear to have 
some form of collateral relief, but some are limited in the 
evidence that may be presented, or retain incidents of old 
common law proceedings that are very different from federal 
habeas. That is why I suggest saying "virtually" all. 
Also, you might go ahead and make the point near the top of 
page 5 that there is no statute of limitations as to federal 
habeas (a few States have limitations periods for their own 
collateral remedies). This is the reason that a prisoner 
has nothing to lose by waiting. Under the present system, 
the capital prisoner would be crazy to seek expeditious rul-
ings on his claims -- far better to wait and litigate only 
when litigation brings the benefit of a stay. 
Page 6: Given the cases that have come he re in the 
past two terms, I think it would be accurate to say that 
there is almost always a second petition, often a third, and 
sometimes a fourth petition filed in capital cases that end 
in execution. 
Page 7: The recent case of Jesse Tafero (or the Harris 
case from California) would provide a perfect illustration. 
- 3 -
As of the end of Ap r il, Tafero had been before the Florida 
Su preme Court at least five times, had two full courses of 
federal habeas review before the district courts and CAll, 
and been before this Court on cert five times. As his 
scheduled execution date approached, Tafero's attorneys 
filed yet another state petition and then a sixth petition 
here. They filed a motion to suspend the effect of that 
denial of relief, for his seventh filing. They then filed a 
third federal habeas petition, receiving a temporary stay 
while the district court considered the claims, again ap-
peared before CAll, and again filed a cert petition and stay 
application. Within a few hours Tafero filed a fourth peti-
tion with a different federal district judge, which never 
came here. This case involved a total of eight filings in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, three within a single week. Given 
that the Justices and Judges give each capital cases high 
degree of individual attention, the strain on the system is 
obvious. Of course, none of Tafero's claims ever suggested 
that he was not in fact guilty of the double murder for 
which he was convicted. 
Page 8: It may be worthwhile in view of the attacks on 
the Powell Committee proposal as a "rush to the gallows" to 
point out just how extensive a system of review would remain 
under this limited reform. A prisoner would appear before a 
trial judge and a jury in a bifurcated proceeding, then pro-
ceed to a full appeal in the state supreme court, followed 
by a cert petition here. He would then return to state 
- 4 -
trial court, supreme court, and perhaps this Court on cert 
in state collateral proceedings. Next, a federal district 
judge, three judge court of appeals panel, and another cert 
petition here. Assuming a five-judge state supreme court, 
the prisoner would at the end of the process have had review 
by at least 19 judges. The suggestions that this is a 
"rush" are not responsible. 
Page 11: With respect to the amendment to the Powell 
Committee recommendation on successive petitions, it would 
be fair to say that the amendment not only "partially de-
feats" the goal of reform, but in fact makes the successive 
petition situation worse than it is now. Any conceivable 
8th Amendment challenge can be described as going to the 
"appropriateness" of the sentence. 
Page 12: In addition to Senate bills, there are now 
ten bills pending in the House. More significant is that 
Rep. Kastenmeier plans to introduce his own bill either 
today or early next week. His staff is supposed to send 
Justice Powell a copy of the new bill, and I will forward a 
copy to you. This bill will be the focus of the House sub-
committee hearings. You also say on this page that a sig-
ni f i cant number of capital cases a re set aside. This is 
true, but the reversal rates quoted by opponents of reform 
include all reversals, including those on technical issues 
of exhaustion, default, and the like. Moreover, even rever-
sals on the merits only result in resentencing. The sugges-
tion often made that reversals reflect a finding that a 
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prisoner was "wrongfully'' sentenced to capital punishment is 
misleading. It would be valuable to have figures showing 
how many of those whose sentences are vacated are ultimately 
resentenced to capital punishment. I have never seen a fig-
ure on this, but my impression is it would be high. 
Page 13: It may not be fair to say that Sen. Biden's 
Bill ( S. 1757) is at the other extreme. The extreme posi-
tion on that side has been staked out by the ABA. The ABA 
proposals may well turn up in Rep. Kastenmeier's bill. In 
any event, it is fair to say that Sen. Biden's bill is not 
just a less effective reform; it would make the situation 
worse than it is now. 
Page 14: It might be more accurate to say that new 
rules will not be applied to defendants "whose trial and 
direct appeal took place before the new rule was announced," 
but this is implicit in what you say earlier. 
Page 18: The theme of public respect for the adminis-
tration of justice is a strong one, and you might emphasize 
it more in concluding the speech. It is fair to say that 
the present system brings the judiciary into disrepute. 
Gov. Deukmejian's statement following the Harris stay pro-
vides an example. The present scheme of litigation by fits 
and starts, multiple warrants and eleventh hour stays, 
wreaks havoc on the courts, prison administrators, the pris-
oner himself, 
tims of the 
first place. 
and the often-forgotten families of the vie-
crime that caused the whole proceeding in the 
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*** 
I hope these general comments are helpful. If I can be 
of any assistance in finding further research materials, 
please let me know. I have a large file on the subject put 
together for the Powell Committee. I have also attached a 
copy of a recent New York Times article by Judge Kaufman, 
and a response sent to the Times by Andrew McBride, who 
clerked for Justice O'Connor last term and is now at OLC. I 
will be stunned if the Times prints McBride's piece, but 
maybe it will spark some further ideas for your speech. If 
you have five or ten minutes to spare sometime, I would ap-
preciate the opportunity to talk with you about this subject 
before I leave in July. Thank you again for letting me look 
over the speech. 
R.H.P. 
- -
May 9, 1990 
Dear Virginia: 
It was most thoughtful of you to send me the copies 
of the habeas corpus bill that was introduced by your Sub-
committee. As I understand it our hearing has now been 
scheduled for Thursday, May 24, at 9:30 a.m. 
I appreciate your also keeping advised (i) my for-
mer law clerk Hewitt Pate, who is now clerking for Justice 
Kennedy, and (ii) Professor Al Pearson, Law School, Univer-
sity of Georgia (Reporter for the Committee appointed by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist). 
Sincerely, 
Ms. Virginia Sloan 
Committee on the Judiciary 
House of Representatives 
2138 Rayburn HOB 
Washington, D. C. 20515-6216 
lfp/ ss 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
R. Hewitt Pate, Esquire 
lfp/ss 05/10/90 HEWl SALLY-POW 
Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, June 27-30 
MEMO TO HEW: 
Chief Judge Ervin, who will preside over the CA4 
Judicial Conference at the Greenbrier, called to ask me to 
talk about the Ad Hoc Committee Report at the Saturday, June 
30, morning session. There will have been a number of de-
velopments since I presenteo the Report of the Committee to 
the Judicial Conference in September, including the expected 
action of the House Committee. I would be grateful if you 
would give me a draft of what you think I should say. A 15 
page double spaced draft will suffice, and I will not need 
it until mid-June. 
I hope that Justice Kennedy will be tolerant of my 
intrusion on your time. He probably knows of your associa-
tion with this subject from the beginning. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
55 
cc: The Chief Justice 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
sJ.L r1 
Dear Lewis, 
j}nµrtntt <!lltllrl of tqt ~~ j;taftg 
:JJrudpnghtn, !). <ll• 2Ilffe~~ 
May 10, 1990 
I enclose an advance copy of the speech I plan to give 
to the American Law Institute on Tuesday, May 15th about 





Remarks of the Chief Justice 
American Law Institute Annual Meeting 
Mayflower Hotel 
May 15, 1990 
This morning I want to talk about a serious malfunction in 
our legal system -- the manner in which death sentences imposed 
by state courts are reviewed in the federal courts. Today the 
average length of time between the date on which a trial court 
imposes a sentence of death, and the date that sentence is 
carried out -- after combined state and federal review of the 
sentence -- is between seven and eight years. More than three 
years of this time are taken up by collateral review alone, with 
little certainty as to when that review has run its course. 
Surely a judicial system properly designed to consider both the 
claim of the state to have its laws enforced and the claim of the 
defendant to the protections guaranteed him by the federal 
Constitution should be able to reach a final decision in less 
time than this. 
The essence of the question is not the pros and cons of 
capital punishment, but the pros and cons of federalism. The 
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Supreme Court has held that capital punishment is lawful if 
imposed consistently with the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment. Whether or not a state should choose to have capital 
punishment must be up to each state: thirty-seven states have 
elected to have it, and thirteen states have chosen not to have 
it. The capital punishment question is one which deeply divides 
people, and always has. But this question is only tangentially 
involved when we consider the procedures designed to provide 
collateral review in the federal courts for federal 
constitutional claims of defendants who have been sentenced to 
death. Surely the goal must be to allow the states to carry out 
a lawful capital sentence, while at the same time assuring the 
capital defendant meaningful review of the lawfulness of his 
sentence under the federal Constitution in the federal courts. 
This, as I have said, is essentially a question of federalism --
what is the proper balance between the lawful authority of the 
states and the role of federal courts in protecting 
constitutional rights? 
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The writ of habeas corpus was originally a creature of the 
English common law, not designed to challenge judgments of 
conviction rendered after trial, but to challenge unlawful 
detention of citizens by the executive. It played much the same 
role in this country for the first century and a half of our 
existence. As a result of judicial decisions and congressional 
ratification of these decisions over the past century, however, 
it has evolved into something quite different. In civil 
litigation, as we all know, once the parties have had a trial and 
whatever appeals are available, the litigation comes to an end 
and the judgment is final. But in criminal cases a defendant 
whose conviction has become final on direct review in the state 
courts may nonetheless raise federal constitutional objections to 
that conviction and sentence in a federal habeas proceeding. 
This system is unique to the United States; no such collateral 
attack is allowed on a criminal conviction in England where the 
writ of habeas corpus originated. 
Reasonable people have questioned whether a criminal 
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defendant ought to have as broad a "second bite at the apple" in 
the federal courts as he presently does, but that is a question 
of policy for Congress to decide. So long as we are speaking of 
non-capital defendants, the present system does not present the 
sort of practical difficulties in the administration of justice 
that it presents in the case of capital defendants. This is 
because someone who is convicted and sentenced to prison for a 
term of years in state court, and wishes to challenge that 
conviction and sentence in a federal habeas proceeding, has every 
incentive to move promptly to make that challenge. He must 
continue to serve his sentence while his federal claims are being 
adjudicated in the federal courts. Therefore, the sooner he 
obtains a decision on these claims, the sooner he will get the 
benefit of any decision that is favorable to him. This is true 
even though there is no statute of limitations for bringing the 
federal habeas proceeding. 
But the incentives are quite the other way with a capital 
defendant. All federal review of his sentence must obviously 
-
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take place before the sentence is carried out; consequently, the 
capital defendant frequently finds it in his interest to do 
nothing until a death warrant is actually issued by the state. 
States also have varying systems of collateral review and one of 
the rules of federal habeas corpus is that certain kinds of 
claims must first be presented to the state courts in collateral 
proceedings before they may be decided on the merits by the 
federal courts. There is no constitutional right to counsel in 
the state collateral review proceedings, and therefore a capital 
defendant is frequently without legal advice as to how to 
proceed. The upshot is that often no action by the defendant is 
taken until shortly before the date set for execution. The 
result is foreseeable: arguments in state and federal courts over 
whether the execution should be stayed pending decision on the 
merits, because there is no provision for an automatic stay. 
Not only is there no statute of limitations for filing for 
federal habeas, but normal rules of res judicata do not apply. A 
criminal defendant is not necessarily barred from bringing a 
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second petition in federal court after his first petition has 
been decided against him on the merits. Instead of res judicata, 
a doctrine of "abuse of the writ" has been developed, but its 
outlines are in some respects not fully developed. As a result, 
a capital defendant, after his first federal habeas petition is 
decided against him, may file a second petition, and even on 
occasion a third petition. On each occasion, arguments are 
pressed that an additional stay of execution is required in order 
for a court to consider these successive petitions. The result 
is that at no point until a death sentence is actually carried 
out can it be said that litigation concerning the sentence has 
run its course. 
The system at present verges on the chaotic. The eight 
years between conviction in the state court and final decision in 
the federal courts is consumed not by structured review of the 
arguments of the parties, but in fits of frantic action followed 
by periods of inaction. My colleagues and I can speak with first 
hand experience of this, and so can the district judges and the 
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judges of the courts of appeals who regularly pass on these 
applications. It is not unknown for our court to have pending 
before it within a period of days not merely one application for 
a stay of execution but two from the same person: one seeking 
review of collateral state proceedings, and the other seeking 
review of federal habeas proceedings, both brought in the court 
of first instance within a matter of days before the execution is 
set to take place. Thus delay is not the only fault in the 
present system. The last-minute nature of so many of the 
proceedings in both the state courts and the federal courts 
leaves one with little sense that the legal process has run an 
orderly course, whether a stay is granted or whether it is 
denied. 
Let me speak briefly with you about the case of Jesse 
Tafero, who was executed on May 4, 1990. The death sentence 
imposed in his case was upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida in 
1981, and in 1982 our Court denied a petition for certiorari. 
Tafero then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied in 
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1985. The denial was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1986, 
and our Court denied certiorari in 1987. Tafero then filed 
another federal habeas petition, which was denied by the District 
Court in 1988. That denial was upheld by the Court of Appeals in 
1989, and our Court denied certiorari on April 16, 1990 --
approximately a month ago. By this time Tafero had had two 
federal habeas petitions proceed through every level of the 
federal courts following the earlier direct review of his 
sentence by the Supreme Court of Florida. The state scheduled 
his execution for May 2, 1990. 
On April 27th, Tafero filed an application in our Court to 
suspend the order denying certiorari pending filing for a 
rehearing, which was denied. Three days earlier, on April 24th, 
he had filed with the Florida Circuit Court his third motion to 
vacate the judgment of death under the Florida proceeding for 
collateral review. This determination was affirmed by the 
Suoreme Court of Florida on April 30th. Tafero then filed his 
third federal habeas petition in the District Court, and that 
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court granted a 48-hour stay of execution to consider it. On May 
3rd the Court denied the petition, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
that denial, and our Court denied a stay of execution. 
Tafero was executed the following day. 
This system cries out for reform. I submit that no one --
whether favorable to the prosecution, favorable to the defense, 
or somewhere in between -- would ever have consciously designed 
it. The question is how the present law can be changed to deal 
with these problems while still serving the federalism goal which 
I mentioned previously. 
In June 1988 I established an Ad Hoc Committee on Federal 
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases under the chairmanship of retired 
Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. In addition to Justice 
Powell, I appointed to this Committee, the Chief Judges of the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, the two federal 
appellate courts having had the most experience with litigation 
about capital sentences, and a district judge from each of these 
circuits. I thought it best to have people on the Committee who 
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not only had a judicial perspective, but who had "hands on" 
experience in dealing with capital sentence proceedings. 
The Committee investigated ways of improving both the 
fairness and efficiency of our system of collateral review in 
death penalty cases. In September of 1989 it issued its report 
recommending the coordination of our state and federal legal 
systems in capital cases and the structuring of collateral 
review. The Report concluded that capital cases "should be 
subject to one fair and complete course of collateral review in 
the state and federal system, free from time pressure of 
impending execution and with the assistance of competent 
counsel." 
Under the Powell Committee proposal, persons convicted of 
capital crimes and sentenced to death would, after a full set of 
appeals, have one opportunity to collaterally attack their 
sentences at the state level and one such opportunity at the 
federal level. Second and successive petitions for collateral 
review would be entertained only if the petitioner could cast 
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doubt upon the legitimacy of his conviction of a capital crime. 
In the absence of underlying doubt concerning guilt or innocence, 
itself, courts would not entertain repetitive petitions attacking 
the appropriateness of the death sentence. 
In the interests of reliability and fairness, the Powell 
Committee proposal would permit states to opt into the unified 
system of collateral review only where they agreed to provide 
competent counsel in state collateral proceedings. Under current 
federal law, counsel is provided in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings, but not in state proceedings. The Powell Committee 
proposal would also require an automatic stay of execution to 
permit the prisoner to bring his petition in an orderly fashion 
and without the pressure of pending execution, and would create a 
new automatic right of appeal from the federal district court to 
the federal court of appeals. 
I believe that the Powell Committee Report strikes a sound 
balance between the need for ensu r ing a careful review in the 
federal courts of a capital defendant's constitutional claims and 
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the need for the state to carry out the sentence once the federal 
courts have determined that its imposition was consistent with 
federal law. The Conference of State Chief Justices at its 
meeting last February unanimously endorsed the report of the 
Powell Committee. When that report was presented to the Judicial 
Conference of the United States in March, five changes were 
proposed to make it closer to the position taken by the American 
Bar Association, which would not only enlarge the scope of 
federal review but make successive habeas petitions more readily 
available than at present. The Judicial Conference was closely 
divided on each of these five amendments, and adopted only two of 
them. 
The first adopted would set more stringent standards for the 
appointment of counsel in state proceedings, and make those 
standards applicable not merely on collateral review but in trial 
and appellate proceedings in the state courts. The second would 
allow a successive habeas petition if the defendant bases the 
claim on a "factual predicate" that could not have been 
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discovered with due diligence and would "undermine" the court's 
confidence "in the appropriateness of the sentence of death." 
This latter amendment, in particular, strikes me as so vague and 
ill-defined as to substantially defeat the purpose of the 
recommendations of the Powell Committee. 
Both Houses of Congress will shortly address themselves to 
this question. The Senate will consider legislation very 
shortly, and later on this month a House Judiciary Subcommittee 
will begin hearings on this subject. Two bills have been 
introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond, the ranking minority member 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The first would allow federal 
habeas review only where a prisoner is unable to secure "full and 
fair adjudication" of his claims in state court. My own view is 
that, while this approach might commend itself some years hence, 
it does not do so at the present time. There have been a 
significant number of capital sentences set aside because federal 
courts decided that the sentences did not conform to the 
requirements of the Eighth Amendment. Very likely this is 
- 14 -
because the contours of the Eighth Amendment as applied to 
capital sentencing have only evolved over the last fifteen years. 
If the present scope of federal habeas review can be retained 
without the delay and other faults contained in it, I think it 
should be. The second bill introduced by Senator Thurmond 
embodies the Powell Committee report, and I think that report 
shows how the present scope of federal habeas review can be 
retained without unnecessary delays. 
Another bill, S.1757, has been introduced by Senator Joseph 
Biden, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. It, in my 
view, is at the other end of the spectrum and would actually 
exacerbate the delays and repetitiousness of the present system. 
It would allow successive petitions where there is a claim of 
"miscarriage of justice." This phrase is apparently derived from 
recent decisions of our Court in another area of habeas law; as 
applied to capital cases it is not well - defined, and its use in 
regulating successive petitions may, as Justice Powell pointed 
out in his testimony, "produce confusion and open the door for 
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abuse." 
Another area where the Powell Committee recommendations are, 
in my judgment, superior to the proposals contained in S.1757 is 
the area of procedural default. Under the rules of procedural 
default, a defendant must object to errors at the time of trial. 
Where the defense fails to object to an error, it waives its 
opportunity to raise the claim. The purpose of the procedural 
default rules is to assure that errors are pointed out at a time 
when they can easily be corrected, not years later in an attempt 
to obtain a new trial. The Powell Committee Report would leave 
these rules in effect. S.1757, by contrast, would make it easier 
for a prisoner to raise claims for the first time years after 
trial, thus exacerbating the problems of piecemeal litigation and 
delay that characterize the present system. And, it would 
accomplish this highly questionable goal by overturning a series 
of Supreme Court cases. 
S.1757 would also overturn an entire body of Supreme Court 
precedent in an area where Congress has never previously 
- 16 -
legislated. For nearly a quarter of a century the Supreme Court 
has wrestled with the problem of whether constitutional decisions 
announcing a new rule of law should or should not be applied 
"retroactively." The Court has gradually, one might say by a 
process of trial and error, decided that decisions which announce 
a new rule should be applied across the board to cases on direct 
review of a state conviction, but that with certain exceptions 
they should not be applied by federal habeas courts to a 
defendant whose trial took place before the new rule was 
announced. The reason for such a doctrine seems obvious: unless 
the new rule is truly a "fundamental principle," essential to a 
just result, state courts should not be penalized for applying 
the federal constitutional law which was in effect at the time of 
trial. But S.1757 would simply abrogate these decisions and 
permit capital defendants to challenge their convictions and 
sentences on the basis of constitutional decisions which had not 
even been announced at the time the case was in the state courts. 
The bill introduced by Senator Thurmond, the bill introduced 
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by Senator Biden, and the Powell Committee Report all provide 
some form of statute of limitations to regulate the time in which 
capital defendants must avail themselves of the opportunity for 
collateral review. The Powell Committee Report sets the statute 
of limitations at six months; S.1757 introduced by Senator Biden 
sets it at one year. A statute of limitations is essential if we 
are to obtain orderly federal habeas review of the sentences, and 
so long as the capital defendant has counsel at this stage it 
imposes no unreasonable burden on him. 
At this moment, there are about twenty-two hundred capital 
defendants on the various "death rows" in state prisons. There 
is no doubt that when some of these defendants present their 
constitutional claims to federal courts, their sentences will be 
set aside. Others of these defendants will, after full federal 
review, obtain a determination that the sentences imposed on them 
were consistent with the federal Constitution. Defendants who 
will ultimately prevail in their claims should not have to wait 
eight years for a decision to that effect, and states seeking to 
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carry out the sentence upon defendants whose claims are rejected 
by federal courts should not have to wait eight years to do that. 
Fair-minded people, whether they personally oppose or favor the 
death penalty, should have no difficulty agreeing that the 
present system is badly in need of reform. 
All of the pending Senate bills on this matter are clothed 
in the garb of "reform," but unfortunately, not all of them are 
designed to achieve the sort of reform which the system badly 
needs. The proposal of the Powell Committee, in my view, 
accomplishes the task while the others do not. Under that 
proposal the capital defendant is given the necessary tools and 
the necessary incentives to make all of his constitutional claims 
in his first federal habeas proceeding, and that proceeding is 
allowed to run its full course in both the district court and in 
the court of appeals without any threat of imminent execution. 
If the result of these proceedings is a determination that the 
state sentence is consistent with the United States Constitution, 
that should (with rare exceptions) conclude the federal review, 
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and the state should be able to carry out its sentence. This is 
a solution to the problem in the best tradition of our federal 
system. It is a solution which will restore public confidence in 
the way capital punishment is imposed and carried out in our 
country. 
• -
May 11, 1990 
Dear Chairman Brooks: 
Thank you for your letter of May 4, inviting me to 
testify on the subject of federal habeas corpus at the hear-
ing of your Subcommittee on Courts now scheduled Thursday, 
May 24, at 9:30 a.m. 
I am happy to accept your invitation. With assist-
ance here at the Court I will try to comply with your re-
quest for the number of copies of my testimony to be filed 
in advance with summaries thereof. 
Hon. Jack Brooks 
Chairman 
Sincerely, 
Committee on the Judiciary 
2138 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, D. C. 20515-6216 
lfp/ ss 
be: The Chief Justice 
Members of the Ad Hoc Committee 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 






RE: Habeas "Reform" 
-
May 16, 1990 
Al Pearson gave me a distressing report yesterday of 
his meeting with Sen. Graham's aides. Sen. Graham is appar-
ently negotiating with Sen. Biden to produce what he calls a 
"compromise" habeas reform package. But the substance of 
the compromise would be to accept all of the provisions of 
the Biden Bill, with the sole exception of the provision 
that would overrule Wainwright v. Sykes. The Bill that Sen. 
Graham appears willing to accept would, among other things 
( 1) impose burdensome counsel standards, ( 2) broaden the 
successive petition rules to allow successive attacks on 
sentence, making the successive petition situation worse 
than it is now, (3) lengthen the limitations period of your 
proposal. These provisions are unfortunate, but at least 
use of this new system would be optional with the States. 
More important is that the "compromise" proposal would over-
rule Teague v. Lane across the board, regardless of whether 
a State "opts in." This would eliminate the move to Justice 
Harlan's view of retroactivity that you long advocated, and 
destroy the Court's recent cases such as Butler v. McKellar 
that have attempted to limit abuse of habeas corpus. I am 
astonished that this proposal has Sen. Graham's support, as 
he has supported good habeas reform measures in the past. 
R.H.P. 
- -
May 16, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Dear Chief: 
I enclose a copy of a memorandum of this date from 
Hew Pate. It reports briefly on Al Pearson's meeting with 
Senator Graham's staff people who are working on what they 
call a "compromise" habeas reform package. 
As I mentioned this morning, the hearing before the 
House Committee is now set for 9:30 a.m., May 24. In view 
of the proliferation of bills I am inclined to stay with the 
recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee. 







DONALD P . LAY 
CH l l!:I" JUDGE 
P . 0 . BOX 75908 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
S T . PA U L . MINNESOTA 5517!5 
May 17, 1990 
The Honorable William H. Rehnquist 
Chief Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, NE 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Chief: 
I appreciate the opportunity to visit with you next Wednesday 
in your chambers in Washington. I will be there at 2:00 p.m. 
One of the matters that I would like to discuss with you 
concerns how we might further expedite the disposition of stay 
matters in capital cases to assist the Supreme Court. First I 
would like to correct a mistaken impression by Justice Kennedy in 
his concurring opinion in Delo v. Stokes, No. A-795 (May 11, 1990). 
Al though we do not have a rule establishing an emergency three 
judge court on a stay matter, our long-standing procedure assigns 
a panel of three judges to an initial habeas capital case and that 
panel remains assigned to that case on any subsequent matters, 
motions, or petitions. The same panel in the Stokes case had 
worked together on his petitions over the last year. Under our 
procedures, when a motion for stay is filed in the federal district 
court, that court immediately notifies the court of appeals deputy 
clerk assigned to capital cases of the pending motion in the 
district court. The three judge panel assigned to the case is also 
immediately notified. Our deputy clerk remains on a 24-hour 
vigilance and in contact with your clerk's office until the matter 
is finally adjudicated. 
This procedure was followed in the Stokes case. When the 
district judge granted Stokes' motion for stay of execution on May 
9, our panel was immediately notified. The panel was notified late 
the next morning, May 10, that the state filed a motion to vacate 
the stay. The various documents and papers filed by the state and 
the attorneys for the petitioner, which included the district court 
record, totaled over 50 pages. However, before the state had filed 
the appeal, one judge had left his office to attend a local funeral 
and thereafter drove to an engagement in Illinois that evening. 
He did not contact his office because he had not been alerted to 
any appeal before he left. He assumed the stay was in effect and 
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no irrevocable action could take place. In hindsight he informs 
me, had he contacted his office, since he was out of the state, he 
would not have been able to review the filings until the next 
morning in order to give careful study of the matter. The panel 
has indicated they placed great reliance on the action of the 
district judge and therefore careful study of the state's motion 
to vacate and the contents of the petition was required. Judge 
Gunn, who granted the stay is one of our strongest district judges 
and was formerly a respected justice on the Missouri State Supreme 
Court. Our court also knew he was familiar with the entire case 
since he had presided over all of Stokes' habeas cases. Our panel 
justifiably assumed Judge Gunn would not have stayed the execution 
without good reason. 
On the morning of May 11, the judges studied the various 
filings presented, a vote was taken, and at approximately 11:00 
a.m. the panel entered its 2-1 order denying the motion to vacate 
the stay. 
I am informed that the state served notice to the clerk of the 
supreme court of the panel's order at that time. However, instead 
of filing a motion to vacate the stay with the Supreme Court, the 
state chose to file a motion for rehearing en bane before our 
court. This motion was filed in the clerk's office on Friday noon. 
We have nine active judges. On that particular Friday afternoon 
one judge was en route to Colorado and two judges, including 
myself, were en route to Little Rock, Arkansas for the investiture 
ceremony of a new district judge. I was notified by the clerk's 
office of the motion to vacate the stay upon my arrival in Little 
Rock. I had the clerk immediately poll the court. However, the 
judges were in seven different states and it was not until 5:30 
p.m. that the clerk reported to me that he was able to obtain votes 
from all judges, except one. Please be aware that it was necessary 
f or t he cler k to d e liver to six judges who were not on the original 
panel the contents of the petition and to forward wherever possible 
the various papers that were received and studied by the panel. 
Once again, I am confident that all judges gave these filings 
careful consideration. 
Our order denying the motion for rehearing en bane was entered 
at approximately 5:30 p.m. Notwithstanding our stay, and unknown 
to us at that time, the state had removed Stokes from death row and 
was preparing him for execution. This occurred notwithstanding our 
direct orders in other cases that they were not to do that as long 
as the stay was in effect. 
There were three judges in Little Rock at the investiture 
ceremony. We attended a reception at 7:30 p.m. at a private home. 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
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The clerk of court had our telephone number and informed me upon 
my arrival at the reception that the Supreme Court had vacated our 
stay, ruling 5-4. We were then informed that the petitioner had 
filed an alternative writ on two others grounds before our court. 
We were alerted, for reasons unexplained, that the Missouri 
Department of Corrections had moved up the time of execution to 
9:30 p.m. Because of the shortness of time, I decided to convene 
the other two judges and myself as a panel to hear this alternative 
writ. The writ was read to us over a speaker phone in Little Rock. 
There was approximately another half hour consultation, then our 
order was entered at approximately 8:15 p.m. denying any further 
stay. It is my understanding that Stokes was executed at 9:30 p.m. 
I recite the above facts to you not as an apology or excuse. 
However, it is my sincere judgment that our procedures are as 
streamlined as those of any circuit in the country. I respectfully 
submit, in light of the irrevocable penalty that Stokes faced, the 
time it took our court to dispose of this matter, to study the 
papers involved, and to give careful consideration to the issues 
was expedient under the circumstances. The delay in obtaining the 
votes from our full court located in seven different states is a 
practical reality which makes these matters difficult to expedite 
by any more prompt means. 
I am now informed that there are five other death sentences 
that will be brought before our court in the next few weeks. There 
are approximately 100 inmates on death row in three states in our 
circuit. My recommendation is, in order to give more prompt 
notification to all of the court, that each of our active judges 
be equipped with a telephone beeper so that wherever they are, 
particularly those that might be traveling or out of the state, 
they can be immediately notified that they should call the clerk's 
off ice in St. Louis. Our geographic spread and the various 
engagements of our judges in and out of the states seem to make 
this imperative. I am exploring the funding of a beeper system 
with Mr. Mecham. 
I am forwarding a copy of this letter to all the Justices so 
that each Justice can be informed of the procedures that we have 
implemented in the past and will continue to follow in the cases 
immediately ahead. If you have any additional suggestions as to 
how we might improve our procedures to provide an even more prompt 
disposition of these matters, I would be happy to receive them. 
I am not aware that our handling of this case in any way deprived 
the state of a fair opportunity for due process in this matter. 
I look forward to having the opportunity to discuss this 
matter with you. 
·~ 
~ 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
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With kind personal regards. 
Sincerely yours, 
DONALD P. LAY 
DPL/ja 
cc: Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 
cc: Justice Byron R. White 
cc: Justice Thurgood Marshall 
cc: Justice Harry A. Blackmun 
cc: Justice John Paul Stevens 
cc: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
cc: Justice Antonin Scalia 
cc: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy 
cc: All Eighth Circuit Judges 
cc: Mr. Mecham 
;,1 
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upal Aid Ciini, 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL 
FROM: AL PEARSON 
RE: HR 4737 (Kastenmeier Bill) 
DATE: May 18, 1990 
I. Introduction 
As you already knew, th.j 5 proposal goes beyond Sena tor 
-Biden 1 ~ bill in many respects. It is a far cry from the Ad Hoc 
Committee I"ccommendations. In this memorandum, I will summarize 
HR 4 7 3 7 f o r· you . J n addition , I w i 11 r c view my recent meeting 
with staff members from the 0ffices of Senators Nunn and Graham. 
They are W()rking. on a compromise proposal that builds on the 
Biden bill ~hough in my opinion this attempt is not very 
sensible if one is interested in developing a balanced piece of 
habeas corpus reform legjslation in the capital punishment area. 
Final) y, I wi11 mention 5 ome ideas f 0r i mprcving the capital 
litigation proce s s at the front rather the back end which either 
you or T might mention before the subcommittee next week . Each 
of these proposals could be implemented without undercutting the 
basic approach outlined in the Ad Hoc Committee 1 s 
recommendation$. 
1 1 . HR 4737 Summari z ed 
A. General St r ucture 
The proposed hill consists of nine sections. It borrows a 
numb e r o f ideas from t h e r c port o f the Ad Hoc Co mm it t e e , but 
adds or ext.ends them signific antly at almost every juncture. 
The provisions of this proposal arc mandatory with the exception 
of the counsel provisions. * You will note that all changes are 
proposed as additions to the present habeas corpus legislation, 
not as a. new and sep,:1.r·ate chapter limited in scope to capital 
c,lses. Thi~ app e ars to be especially important in connection 
wjth section 7 of the bill dealing with procedural default. The 
c ounse 1 mechanism is technically optional with each state but. 
only if the state is willing to litigate capital cases without: 
(a) any federal procedural default rule at all even the very 
forgiving !'section 7 procedural default whi~~h is proposed as a 
substitute for Wainwright v. Sykes and (b) any presumption that 
state fact finding is correct under section 2254(d). 
* Some provisions apply to non-capital cases. 
191 Em Bro.ad Street Suite 310 • Athens, Georgia 30601 • (404) 542-4241 
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Effectively, HR 4737 proposes changes that are highly 
beneficial to capital litigants whether or not a . . . _ 
st.ate provides c ounsc l in accordanc c with the exac tin .g 
competency ruJes of section 8. In addition, it provides de~ 
federal review in all capital cases if a state ignores or fails 
to comply with section 8. Bear in mind here that existing law 
already provides fer the federal appointment of counsel in 
capital cases anyway . This means that a state 1 s inability or 
refusal to appoint counsel that are competent under the section 
8 standards becomes an irrelevancy. The real defe n se of a 
capital case under HR 4737 will begin in federal court in the 
event of non-compliance with section 8. The proponents of HR 
4737 probably de nat see this as a penalty mechanism, but rather 
as the pref erred consequence of the law if enacted . In this 
respect, , HR 4 7 37 is an extraordinarily d isengenuous proposal. 
B. Section-By-Section Analy:::is.,':-
1. Sect. i.on 2--It establishes a one year requirement for 
the filing of a federal habeas corpus action in capital cases. 
The time period runs from the point when a state conviction is 
deemed to have become final. ¥inality includes the opportunity 
fer Supreme Court review. The Ad Hoc Committee proposal links 
the time period ( 180 days under ou1· proposal) to the date of 
appointment of counsel. 
Section 2 i ncludes telling rules similar in some respects 
to those proposed by t h e Ad Hoc Committee. The one yea r period 
mentioned above is tolled indefinitely in capital cases if 
counsel is not a ppointed in full compliance with section 8. Of 
course, since one can challenge the competency of counsel 
appointed under section 8 even in habeas proceedings, one never 
knows whether this tolling rule is applicable until the end of 
the first round of f eder~l habeas review--nct an optimal 
approach if you are tryi.ng to promote some degree of efficiency 
in the operation of the ::;ystem. 
The remai.ning tolling rules are probably comparable to ours 
except section 2 which would toll the one year period in 
situations where a certiorari petition is filed following state 
habeas corpus review. The Ad Hee Comrni t t ce concluded that two 
chances for Supreme Court review rather than three was adequate. 
* Section 1 just states the title of the proposed legislation: 
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Section 2 provides for dismissal if the one year time 
requirement is not satisfied, but allows for an override of the 
dismissal sanction if a litigant can make a colorable showing of 
innocence or ineligibility f or the death penalty. An override 
is also available if '' other exceptional circumstances warrant a 
waiver. 11 ~1Li is is an example of the bill I s pref crence for back 
end rathef'7~ont end remedies. 
2. Section 3--It provides fo r mandatory stays of execu-
tions in capital cases. It is comparable to the proposal of 
the Ad Hoc Comm:i. ttee. l don't think that it warrants anv 
comment before the subcommi t tee. · 
J. Section 4--It nominally restric t s successive petitions 
in capital c a ses. If a claim has not been previously raised _, 
this section p r ovides several distinct ways to litigate it in a 
federal habeas proceeding. the most important of whi c h is in 
case s where a new right is made rctr9actively applicable. This 
provision appears innocuous until you turn to section 6 which 
overrules Tea~ue v. Lane. The Cl)mbined effect of sections 4 and 
6 provide an excellent legal basis for filing a colorable 
successive petition. 
In addition, a litigant can file a colorable second 
petition if the new claim raises guilt / innocence issues or 
que s tion s about the " appropriateness u of a capital sentence. 
This prov ision reflects a major point of difference with the Ad 
Hoc Comm i ttee re c ~mmendations. Then , as if the preceding rule 
were not 5ufficient , secti o n 4 allows for a s uccessive petition 
ba s ed on a previously unl i t. igated claim if 11 necessary" to 
prevent. a miscarriage of justice. Both the nappropriateness 11 
and the :: miscarriage of justice 11 standards are vague and fact 
specific in na.t.ure. It is diffieul t to s e e how they in any 
meaningful sense promote f in a li t.y. When you couple them with 
the retroactivity rule that section 4 incorporates by reference 
from section 6, the idea that this provision is a limit on 
successive petitions i s difficult to understand. 
Finally, sect.ion 4 allows a federal court in capital cases 
to reconsider previously litigated claims if the petitioner can 
demonstrate that it would be in " the interests of justice !! to 
reconsider such claims. 
4. Sect.ion 5--It deals with certificates of probable cause 
to appeal and is comparable to the Ad Hoc Committee 1 s proposal. 
It doesn't warrant comment before the subcommittee. 
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5, Section 6--This section overrules Teague v. Lane 
flatly and unequivocally. It allows a petitioner in a capital 
case to get the benefit of the law in effect at the time a 
decision is handed down. Of course, this principle applies 
whenever a successive petition is filed as well. It is crucial 
to the establishment of the infinite regression model of capital 
defense litigation. 1 don't see how any state that has capital 
punishment would view this provision favorably. Bear in mind 
that this provision is not linked to any reform of death penalty 
procedures jn capital habeas litigation. It would apply to all 
federal habeas cases capital and non-capital. ~ 
6. Section 7--This section overrules Wainwright v. Sykes. 
It pays nominal respect to the independent .and adequate state 
ground rationale and then softens the procedural default rule to 
the point that it is virtually non-existent. In addition to the 
"cause" and ''prejudice" tests as an escape from procedural bar, 
section 7 permits a litigant to overcome procedural bar if 
necessary to avoid a "mi.scarriage of justice 11 • It then goes on 
to elaborate on the 11 cause" standard. It makes clear that the 
"knowing bypass" test is being revived and that it would present 
the only clear cut legal basis for finding a lack of cause. 
Another noteworthy aspect of this elaboration on the 11 causc" 
standard is that any development in the law after a state 
conviction has become final on direct appeal is per se "causett 
for failure to raise a claim under section 7. 
Like the retroacti.vity 
applie s to all cases, capital 
whether a state complies with 
in section 8. 
rule in section 6, this section 
and non-capital. It is immaterial 
the counsel requirements set forth 
7. Section 8--This section establishes a detailed and 
highly exacting series of counsel standards and makes them 
applicable throughout al) state and federal phases of capital 
litigation. The obligation to fund and organi~e this scheme 
rests entirely with the states having capital punishment. The 
costs are potentially so great that few states, if any, would be 
tempted to try t~ comply with section 8. 
Suffice it to say, this section would limit the number of 
attorneys who can qualify as lead or co-counsel in capital 
1 i tiga ti<..rn to a highly select f ew--mcstly individuals already 
heavily corumi tted to capital defense litigation in the first 
place and hence those most inclined morally and philosophically 
to extend the length of capital 1 i tigation to its absolute 
limit. The sanction for failure to turn capital defense 
P.01 
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litigation 0vc r to this g roup of attorne ys is to deny any effe ct 
to ~tate court adjudication in c apital cases and then to tu r n 
such cases over· to capital defense specialists for de novo 
review in federal court. 
In my opinion, the sanction mechanism is not calculated to 
generate state efforts t1.) develop better systems of capital 
defense representation. It is designed to assure that virtually 
any politically feasible attempt ti.) improve and extend such 
representational schemes cannot suc c eed. This effectively sets 
the stage for shifting all serious and potentially final review 
ln capital cases over to the federal courts. In effect, section 
8 would make state involvement in capital cases a long and 
expensive prologue to the main event. Again, it is difficult to 
understand how any state which has ca.pi tal punishment could 
justify supporting section 8 or virtually any part of HR 4737. 
8. Sect ion 9--This provision appears to soften Rose v. 
Lundy. It permits dismissal of non-exhausted claims but 
does not re qui re di~missal. When one couples this with the 
proposed changes in the retroact i vi ty and procedural default 
rules, section 9 would permit capital habeas litigation to be 
conducted in a piecemeal fashion. It would make the process 
more confused and confusing than anyone can reasonably imagine 
at this point. 
Note that this section applies to all cases, capital and 
non-capital. 
C. Conclusion 
HR 4737 is a bill that reforms habeas corpus generally. It 
is not limited to capital cases. It is the ideal approach to 
habeas corpus review if you are deeply skeptical of the way in 
which state criminal justice systems operate. It gives little 
finality or presumption of correctness even in non-capital cases 
and almost none in capital case~. If the skeptics are correct 
in their assessment of s tate criminal justice systems, then HR 
4737 should have been enacted long ago. If the states are 
unwi lli n,g to accept the proffered challenge to the underlying 
fairness of thci r criminal just ice sys t:ems, as they no doubt 
are, it is difficult to understand why HR 4737 was proposed. In 
states where capital punishment is not in force, one would have 
particular cause to wonder why this statute is needed. 
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III. Staff Meeting with Nunn and Graham Representatives 
On Monday, May 14, 1990 ., I met with representatives from 
the staffs of Senators Nunn and Graham. They are working on a 
compromise based on the Biden bi.ll. Senator Graham is quite 
eager to get some type of habeas corpus reform legislation 
passed. Essentially, he is willing to go along with the Biden 
bill if the procedural default rule in it is deleted. The trade 
off is that Senator Graham would support a provision worded 
almost exactly like section 6 of HR 4737 overruling 
Teague v. Lane. l t is hard to understand why Senator Graham 
views this as a compromise since the "new law 11 argument often 
provides an arguable basis for showing "cause" under 
Wainwright v. Sykes. In any event, Senator Graham finds some 
kind of equivalcncy that eludes me. 
Senator Graham disliked the Ad Hoc Committee report 1 s 
refusal to allow second petitions challenging the sentence 
determination. His staff . person appeared to understand what I 
said in explanation of the Ad Hoc Commi ttce position, but he 
believed that Senator Graham would never accept it as an 
adequate rationale. To Senator Graham, it makes the system look 
like it is willing to send persons to their fate while ignoring 
potentially valid arguments against the imposition of capital 
punishment in particular cases. 
IV. Othe r Reform Options 
I 1 i st here some additional steps that would improve the 
fairness of capital litigation at the front end and have the 
additional benefit of making federal review more effective and 
final when it occurs: 
1. Establish discovery rules in capital cases that would 
give capital defense litigators access to the prosecutor 1 s files 
or designated portions of them in advance of trial. Include in 
this the right under designated circumstances to depose 
witnesses in ca pital cases. 
2. Establish immunity rules under which a capital litigant 
can obtain the testimony of individuals who might have favorable 
infor·mation but would otherwise be e x posed to possible self-
incrimination. 
J. Make mental and physical examinations of the defendant 
mandatory in all cases in which capital punishment is sought. 
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4. Require more liberal dis c overy in both 
federal post conviction proceeding s s o that 
undiscovered evidence that might give rise to 




5. Require states to make more liberal use of foreign jury 
panels in cases where the community climate for a trial is 
potentially inflamed. 
6. Provide sufficient federal funding so that the states 
can develop schemes of representation in capital cases that meet 
congressional standards. 
IV. Conclusion 
This overview became more detailed than I had originally 
intended. Please call me or have Hew Pate call me for further 
discussion if that would be helpful to you. I intend to arrive 
early enough on Wednesday, May 23, 1990 to be available for a 
full discussion of the upcoming testimony. 
TOTAL P.03 
- -
May 22, 1990 
Memo to Marshal's Office: 
On Thursday, May 24, at 9:30 a.m., I will be testi-
fying before the House Subcommittee on Courts in Room 2226 
of the Rayburn building. 
Please reserve a Court car to leave the building at 
9:10 a.m. Nat will drive. 
I would like a police officer in uniform to escort 




May 22, 1990 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Dear Chief: 
As you know, I have been invited to testify before 
a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary at 
9:30 a.m., on Thursday, May 24. Professor Al Pearson has 
also been asked to testify. I believe that Paul Roney of 
our Committee will be present, and do not know whether he 
will testify. Charles Clark had a conflict that will pre-
vent him from attending. 
I enclose a copy of the full Statement that I have 
prepared with the assistance of Hew Pate. Eighty-five 
copies of this statement are being filed with the Committee 
this afternoon. When I testify, I will use a greatly abbre-
viated summary. I have been told that the Subcommittee 
would expect me not to exceed a half-a-dozen minutes. 
Pending bills, introduced by Biden and Kastenmeier, 
would as a practical matter, prevent the enforcement of cap-
ital punishment. 
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My Summary Testimony Tomorrow 
MEMO TO HEW: 
I think it best to identify the two changes made in 
the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee that the Confer-
ence adopted. We could add a brief paragraph along the 
lines of the attached draft. I would appreciate your adding 
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Dear Tony, 
.i'npi-mtt Qiqnrt of tfrt ~h ~btttg 
:.uJringhtn. ~. QI. 2.0ffe~.;t 
May 23, 1990 
Re: Mccleskey v. Zant, No. 89-7024 
I do not think reformulating the questions presented in the 
above case is necessary. The questions as phrased by the 
petitioner adequately raise all the issues in the case. Cert 
petitions often frame questions presented in an argumentative or 
possibly " i nf lammatory" manner. Since petitioner is represented 
by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, we can be sure that the briefing 
will be of high quality. 
Moreover, I do not believe that your proposed question 2--
whether the Sixth Amendment was violated--is presented in the 
case at this juncture. The CAll assumed that there was a 
violation but found it harmless. If we conclude that there was 
no abuse of the writ and that the CAll's analysis of the harmless 
error issue was erroneous, the CAll would address the merits of 
the Sixth Amendment claim on remand. I see no reason that this 
Court should address the merits of the Sixth Amendment claim in 
the first instance. 
Unless one of the other three who voted to grant cert would 
prefer the reformulated questions, I would prefer not to change 




Copies to the Conference 
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May 24, 1990 
Dear Al: 
I think our hearing before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee today went well. Between the three of us, we made 
the best arguments that can be made for the recommendations 
of the Ad Hoc Committee. Your responses to questions about 
the Kastenmeier bill were particularly good. 
It has been a pleasure to have the opportunity to 
work with you. Over the long years of my private practice, 
including substantial litigation, you would rank with the 
best lawyers I have known. I have marveled at your capacity 
to work quickly without losing the effectiveness of what you 
write. 
If I were in Georgia I would enjoy supporting you 
for Attorney General of the state. Whenever you are here at 
the Court, I will welcome the opportunity to see you. 
Sincerely, 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 




May 24, 1990 
Dear Hew: 
I assume that at 11:30 a.m. today 
when we left the House Judiciary Committee 
hearing room, the work of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee ended. I have reported to the Chief 
Justice by telephone, and he expressed 
warmly his appreciation for what we tried 
to accomplish. 
In all of this I relied a great 
deal on your intelligent assistance. How-
ever we may come out with the Congress, I 
think the Ad Hoc Committee will have made 
an important educational contribution. 
Your role in this was an important 
one. 
Sincerely, 
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Dear Paul: 
It was most helpful to have you beside me at the 
hearing before the Kastenmeier Committee this morning. Your 
long experience with federal habeas corpus qualified you as 
a truly expert witness. My impression was that we presented 
the best case that can be made for the recommendations of 
the Ad Hoc Committee. 
The assignment given us by the Chief Justice was 
not an easy one. The opportunity to serve with - and to 
know you even better - is one I appreciate. I feel the same 
way about Charles Clark and the other members of our Commit-
tee. We had a strong and conscientious Committee. 
I admire your good judgment in retiring at an age 
when you and Sally can do the things we all would like to 
do. But I must say that at my ancient age I would not un-
dertake - as you and Sally will - a trip around the world. 
Jo would certainly join me in sending affectionate best 
wishes to you and Sally. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Paul H. Roney 
U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit 
601 Federal Office Building 
St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 
lfp/ss 
cc: Hon. Charles Clark 
Hon. Wm. Terrell Hodges 
Hon. Barefoot Sanders 
DONALD P . LAY 
CHIEF JUDG E 
P. 0 . BOX 7590B 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
May 30, 1990 
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.11 JUN 1990 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Retired Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, NE 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Justice Powell: 
I was sorry that we did not get a chance to visit longer at 
the Congressional hearing. I sincerely feel that our modifications 
of the committee report at the conference are not as severe as 
people try to make them be. We are all indebted to you for your 
efforts in illuminating these important issues. It appears that 
the Senate did not listen to any of us and simply wrote a bill 
(parts of it in the hallway and cloakroom). It has some provisions 
that are unthinkable. 
Sometime ago I wrote an article in the Detroit Law Review on 
habeas corpus relating to the Stone v. Powell decision. As you can 
see in my discussion of that decision, I had some personal 
involvement because of the companion case of Rice v. Wolff. I 
thought you might appreciate the personal anecdote that I relate 
in that decision. 
Sometime ago I wrote to you for a small favor. I mentioned 
that I am a United States stamp collector and I was trying to get 
a set of f ~ t ~ay cove_!'.s of the Supreme Court stamp for my 
grandson. A o the Justices were kind enough to send me a 
personal envelope with their signature on it. You were kind to do 
so. 
Unfortunately, in mailing these to the Postmaster for the 
first day cover, they now assert that they have "misplaced" four 
of these. One of the misplaced envelopes was yours. I wonder if 
I could impose up on you aga i n t o send me an unfranked, personal 
envelope with your signature in the left hand corner. The 
Postmaster has assured me that I can hand deliver them to the 
Postmaster here and they will provide the special first day 
stamping. I hope you will not find this too burdensome to do. 
With kind personal regards. 
,. .,, Sincerely yours, 
·e -(fl) 
--1 7 85--
The University of Georgia 
School of Law 
Legal Aid Clinic 
µ-'~~ 
June 7, 1990 
Justice Lewis F. Powell 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
l 1 JUN 1990 
I received your gracious and generous letter of May 24, 1990. 
Thank you for taking the time to write it. I gained a lot working 
on the project and working with you and the others involved. 
Whenever someone speaks well of me as you did in your letter, 
the best response I can give is to live up to the compliments 
bestowed by my actions in the future. I will stay in touch to 
make sure that you take good care of yourself and decline onerous 
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June 25, 1990 
The Honorable William' Rehnquist 
Chief Justice 
Supreme Court of the nited 
One First Street, N.E. ---- -
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Chief Justice Rehnquist: 




HARRISBURG, PA. 17120 
{717 ) 787-3391 
As you know, the issue of federal Habeas Corpus revision is a 
subject of much debate (sometimes heated) in the Congress, in the 
American Bar Association, in the Judicial Conference, amongst 
Attorneys General, and prosecutors. 
As you know, the Senate has for the moment approved by voice 
vote the Specter-Thurmond Amendment of Senator Joe Biden's S.1970. 
The entire bill, however, still remains open to the other 
amendments and final passage is somewhat uncertain. 
The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property and the Administration of Justice, chaired by 
Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, recently completed several 
days of testimony ony is subject. 
Former Associate Justice Powell, who under your charge 
reported last year several helpful recommendations, testified 
before that Subcommittee. On t he opposing side were several 
federal judges, the A.B.A., and other interest groups who favored 
H.R. 4737, Representative Kastenmeier's bill. 
Although, because of time constraints, I was not able to be 
designated as the National Association of Attorneys 
spokesperson on this issue, I was the only Attorne 
indeed, the only state prosecutor to e i 
t estimony waste pro uc o e coml;>in~e~d::ce~f.i-:-f Mo~r~t~s~ o~f -~~ of 
several Attorneys General, most notably Mississippi, Texas, 
Georgia, California, and North Carolina. To be sure, I reiterated 
m stro o os"ti n to the ill. I have enclosed a copy of my 
June 6, 19 O, testimony for your review. 
-1,l - -Page 2. - The Honorable William H. Rehnquist 
Since that time, I have met on several occasions with Senator 
Arlen Specter to request that he accept clarifying amendments to 
the Specter-Thurmond compromise, for, as prosecutors, we cannot 
~ upport that hastily prepared and impractical compromise that 
✓bypasses the state Habeas process and permits an "a~pro~riateness r 
of death" review by federal courts that, as you have po1-nted out, ~ 
is vague, standardless, and in my judgement, without legal 0 
precedent. 
In those meetings with Senator Specter, I have been ably aided 
by Ron Castille, Philadelphia District Attorney, and, the 
legislative chairman of the National District Attorneys 
Association. 
I am pleased to report that our meetings with Senator Specter 
have been productive thus far. The Senator has indicated a 
willingness to consider our clarifying proposals, and, where 
possible, work them into Specter-Thurmond, most likely in 
conference committee. 
I have also spoken on two occasions with Representative Bill 
Hughes of New Jersey, who is chair of the Crimes Subcommittee of 
the House Judiciary Committee, and who is a member of 
Representative Kastenmeier's Subcommittee. Congressman Hughes is 
important in this process because Congressman Jack Brooks, Chair of 
House Judiciary, has designated Mr. Hughes as coordinator of the 
House anti-crime bill passage. 
On June 21, 1990, along with Attorney General Bob Del Tufo of 
New Jersey, I also met at length with Congressman Hughes' 
Subcommittee Counsel, Andy Fois, as well as House Judiciary 
Counsel, Hayden Gregory. They have informed me that Representative 
Kastenmeier's bill will be the markup vehicle for the Habeas Corpus 
portion of the House package. The first markup is scheduled for 
Wednesday, June 27, 1990. The intent is to complete markup by July 
4 , 1990. 
I have been informed that Congressman Bill Mccollum, a ranking 
minority member of the House Judiciary Committee, has been 
designated by Chief of Staff Sununu to be the Administration's 
point person on the House package. In a sense, he would be 
Congressman Hughes' counterpart on the package. 
Congressman Mccollum has informed myself and other prosecutors 
at a meeting on Thursday, June 21, that Speaker Foley has told him 
he hoped to bring the House package up for vote as early as August 
and surely before the election recess in the fall. 
- -Page 3. - The Honorable William H. Rehnquist 
The House Judiciary Counsel has asked Attorney General Del 
Tufo and myself to give them our five highest priority suggested 
revisions. But, given the makeup of the Committee, I am not 
optimistic that the House Judiciary Subcommittee and full Committee 
will do much to accommodate our suggestions. 
Nonetheless, I will continue to work with all interested 
groups and legislative bodies to provide whatever assistance I can 
to achieve the oal you have set out i revising our death penalty 
To that end, I have enclosed a proposed resolution to be 
submitted to the National Association of Attorneys General at the 
July 8-11, 1990 meeting. I am hopeful tha.t mobilizing Attorneys 
General and the National District Attorneys Association and its 
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